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Brief of Appellant

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953 as amended).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

Issues
1.

The trial court abused its discretion as a matter of

law when it refused to allow Mr. Mills to withdraw his guilty
plea where Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure was
not strictly complied with at the time the plea was accepted by
the court.

1

2.

The trial court abused its discretion when it refused

to allow Mr. Mills to withdraw his guilty plea for good cause
where evidence was presented to the court showing that Mr, Mills'
plea was entered involuntarily and under coercion or duress due
to the "package deal" nature of the plea bargain and the fact
that Mr. Mills was pressured and threatened by codefendants.

2

II.

Standard of Review
A plea of guilty may be withdrawn "only upon good cause

shown and with leave of the court."
77-13-6(2) (a) (1953 as amended).

Utah Code Ann. §

A trial court's denial of a

motion to withdraw the plea may be overturned if it clearly
appears that the trial court abused its discretion.
Jennings, 875 P.2d 566 (Utah App. 1994).

State v.

The trial court has

abused its discretion as a matter of law if it does not permit a
defendant to withdraw a plea that was not made in strict
compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Id., quoting State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 476 (Utah App. 1991),
cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).
Defendant attempted to preserve the first issue in the trial
court.

(Withdrawal of Plea Transcript at 16). However, whether

or not the issue was preserved in the trial court is of no
consequence for this Court, for "[b]oth the Utah Supreme Court
and the Utah Court of Appeals have allowed a Rule 11 challenge to
the voluntariness of a plea to be considered for the first time
on appeal."
1990),

State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 774 (Utah App.

See also State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah

App. 1989) .
Defendant preserved the second issue of voluntariness

3

throughout the entire record of the hearing before the trial
court on defendant's Motion to Withdraw Pleas.
Withdrawal of Plea Transcript at 3 ) .

4

(See, e.g.,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This case involves fairly straight forward circumstances and

arises from the trial court's

denial of defendant David L.

Mills' motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to two criminal
offenses.
The first issues deals with non-compliance with Rule 11, of
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

This Court has previously

ruled that a trial court's failure to strictly comply with Rule
11 in accepting a guilty or no contest plea constitutes good
cause, as a matter of law, for the withdrawal of that plea.
Furthermore, strict Rule 11 compliance must be demonstrated on
the record at the time the guilty or no contest plea is entered.
State v. Smith, supra, at 3.

This court must decide whether,

based on the record, Rule 11 was strictly complied with at the
time Mr. Mills entered his guilty plea.
Even if this Court finds that Rule 11 was strictly

complied

with, this Court must decide whether Mr. Mills' guilty plea was
entered voluntarily, which is the second issue.

Mr. Mills

alleges that his plea was entered under duress and coercion
because of the nature of a "package deal" plea bargain (which was
available only if all of the codefendants accepted it) and the
fact that he was not allowed to be tried separately from those
5

codefendants.

Mr. Mills claims that he feared retaliation from

the other defendants if he did not accept the plea bargain, and
therefore that his plea was entered under duress and because of
coercion and thus the plea was involuntarily.

The all-or-none

nature of the plea agreement was not brought to the attention of
the trial court by the prosecutor, and Mr. Mills was never
questioned as to the voluntariness of his plea.

This Court must

decide (1) if the trial court's failure to question Mr. Mills as
to the voluntariness of his plea in violation of Rule 11(e)(2),
the trial court's failure to obtain a waiver from the defendant
of his fundamental constitutional rights in violation of
11(e)(3), the trial court's failure to inform the defendant of
the nature and elements of the offenses in disregard of 11(e)(4),
and the trial court's lack of knowledge of the terms of the plea
bargain, which violates 11(e)(6), amounts to good cause as a
matter of law to allow withdrawal of the pleas, or (2) if the
trial court, when presented with evidence of Mr. Mills' claims at
the withdrawal hearing, abused its discretion in ruling that good
cause did not exist to allow Mr. Mills to withdraw his guilty
pleas.

6

II.

Course of the Proceedings and Dispositions Below
On January 5, 1994 the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Judge of the

Sixth Judicial District Court in and for the County of Sanpete,
State of Utah, at the Central Utah Correctional Facility in
Gunnison, Utah, bound defendant Mr, David Mills over for trial on
one count of riot and one count of injuring a jail.
Hearing Transcript at 88-89).

(Preliminary

Defendants Jeffery Eaton, Michael

Bradley, Philip Bolin and Michael Land were bound over on various
charges at the same time.

(Id.)

The trial court ordered all

defendants to stand trial together.

(Id. at 91).

On March 21, 1994 defendants Eaton, Land and Mills were
present for a jury trial before the same Judge and in the same
location as the preliminary hearing.

(See Trial Transcript).

jury was empaneled and sworn, and a recess was called.
12).

A

(Id. at

Following the recess but without the jury present, the

trial court heard a motion for discovery from defendant, and a
motion in limine from plaintiff, ruled on the motions, and
another recess was called.

(Id. at pp. 17-27).

Following this

recess, without any testimony or evidence being presented, a
resolution of the cases was reached whereby defendants entered
guilty pleas to amended charges.

(Id. at 28). Mr. Mills plead

guilty to one count of attempt to riot, a class A misdemeanor and
one count of attempt to injure a jail, a class A misdemeanor.
7

(Id. at 34-35).

Mr. Mills and the other defendants were

sentenced on that same day.

(Id. at 3 6-38).

On April 18, 1994 defendant filed a timely Motion to
Withdraw Guilty Pleas together with an Affidavit of David L.
Mills and Memorandum in Support of the Motion.
as exhibit " A " ) .

(Attached hereto

On May 4th, 1994 at the Sanpete County

Courthouse in Manti, Utah, oral arguments concerning defendant's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea were made before Judge Tibbs.
(Withdrawal of Plea Transcript).

After hearing testimony from

Mr. Mills as well as the other defendants in the case, Judge
Tibbs denied defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas.

(Id. at

17).
Mr. Mills now brings this appeal challenging the trial
court / s refusal to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea.

His

Notice of Appeal (attached hereto as Exhibit H B") dated May 25,
1994 was timely filed.

8

III.

Statement of Facts
On August 9, 1993 there was a disturbance at the Central

Utah Correctional Facility in Gunnison, Utah which involved a
large number of inmates behaving in a riotous fashion and
injuring the facility.

(Preliminary Hearing Transcript).

A

total of Twenty-one inmates were charged for offenses arising
from the incident.

One group of five inmates were charged as

codefendants in the case at bar.

These five codefendants were

brought before the court for the purpose of determining whether
probable cause existed to bind them over for trial on a variety
of charges stemming from the riot incident.

(Id. at 4 ) .

Defendants Phillip J. Bolin, Michael J. Bradley, Jeffery E.
Eaton, and Michael A. Land were present at the hearing and
represented by Douglas L. Neeley.

fid, at 2 ) . Defendant David

L. Mills, the appellant in this action, was present and
represented by Jeffery P. Gleave.

(Id.)

At the conclusion of

the evidentiary portion of the preliminary hearing, the trial
court ordered defendants bound over to stand trial on charges as
follows:

Phillip Bolin on riot, possession of a dangerous weapon

at a correctional facility, and attempted escape; Michael Bradley
on riot; Jeffery Eaton on riot, and possession of a dangerous
weapon at a correctional facility; Michael Land on riot and

9

attempted escape; and David Mills on riot and injuring a jail,
fid, at 88-89).
Following the trial court's ruling on the issue of probable
cause, Mr. Gleave moved the court to sever the defendants for
purposes of trial,

(Id. at 90).

Mr. Gleave explained (1) that

there would be conflicts in defense tactics in that Mr. Mills
wished to use video tapes as evidence that the other defendants
would oppose; (2) that the sheer number of defendants would
likely prejudice a jury in a trial on the charge of riot; and (3)
that all defendants were not charged with the same counts.
Mr. Neeley concurred on the motion.

(Id. at 90-91).

(Id.)

Without

elaboration, the trial court denied the motion to sever.

(Id. at

91).
A jury trial commenced on March 21, 1994 on the charges
against Jeffery Eaton, Michael Land and David Mills.
Transcript).
to this date.)

(Jury Trial

(The other two defendants settled their cases prior
Though a jury was empaneled, no testimony was

heard by the jury because plaintiff and defendants reached an
agreement whereby defendants would plead guilty to amended
charges.

(Id. at 28).

The resolution followed a recess of

approximately 45 minutes, and occurred in response to the trial
courts earlier rulings on motions by both sides.

(Id.)

Jeffery Eaton's charges were amended to one Class-A
10

Misdemeanor charge of attempted riot, and one Class-A Misdemeanor
charge of attempting to injure a jail.

(Id. at 29). Michael

Land's charges were amended to one Class-A Misdemeanor charge of
attempted riot, and one attempted escape charge reduced to a
Class-A Misdemeanor.

(Id. at 29-30).

David Mills' charges were

amended to one Class-A Misdemeanor charge of attempted riot, and
one Class-A Misdemeanor charge of attempting to injure a jail.
(Id. at 29). Thus, all three defendants' charges were reduced to
two Class-A Misdemeanors.

Mr. Mills pled guilty to both counts,

and such pleas were accepted by the court.

fid, at 3 4-35)•

Defendants waived their statutory right to defer sentencing, and
were sentenced immediately.

(Id. at 36). The trial court

sentenced each of the defendants to the Sanpete County Jail for a
term of one year on each count, sentences to run concurrently
with each other and with the sentences that defendant's were
already serving.

(Id, at 38-39).

David Mills was never informed, on March 21, 1994 when he
entered his guilty pleas, of many of the various fundamental
constitutional rights that he was waiving and other information
contemplated in Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

The trial court's only reference to constitutional

rights was to refer to previous matters.
33).

(Trial Transcript at

The court engaged in no specific colloquy with Mr. Mills or
11

any other defendant regarding Rule 11(e) requirements.
Specifically, at no time on that date was Mr. Mills informed by
the court of (1) the nature and elements of the crimes to which
he pled guilty, nor was there a plea affidavit prepared or
executed;

(2) constitutional rights that the defendant would be

waiving if he plead guilty; or
voluntary.

(3) whether Mr. Mills' plea was

Finally, the trial court was not informed of the

"package deal" nature of the plea bargain.
On April 18, 1994 defendant David Mills filed a timely
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
hereto).

(Exhibit "A" attached

On May 4, 1994 oral arguments were heard before the

trial court on the motion to withdraw.
Transcript).

(Withdrawal of Plea

David Mills, Jeffery Eaton and Michael Land each

testified at the hearing.

(Id. at 2).

The following facts were

elicited by the testimony:
1.

The plea bargain that was offered to Mr. Mills and the

other defendants was a "package deal" which was conditioned upon
acceptance by all defendants as a group.

(Withdrawal of Plea

Transcript at 5-6, 12). The prosecutor did not bring the
all-or-none nature of the agreement to the attention of the court
at the time the pleas were taken.
2.

Mr. Mills did not want to accept the plea bargain offer

because he did not believe it to be in his best interest.
12

(Id.

at 6).

He did not feel that the bargain would substantially

benefit him or provide for any earlier release from prison.

(Id.

at 8) .
3.

Codefendant Jeffery Eaton was particularly desirous of

accepting a plea bargain since he feared significant extension of
his sentence if he lost at trial.

(Id. at 11-12, 14). In

addition to the riot charges, Mr. Eaton was facing trial on the
more serious charge of possession of a dangerous weapon at a
correctional facility, a second degree felony.

(Preliminary

Hearing Transcript at 88-89 and Addendum Exhibit "C").
Codefendant Michael Land also felt he stood to gain from the plea
bargain in terms of time served in prison.

(Withdrawal of Plea

Transcript at 14-15).
4.

Mr. Mills felt pressured to accept the plea bargain

against his desire by the requirements of the "Court attorney"
(Sanpete County Attorney), his codefendants' attorney, Douglas
Neeley, and his codefendants, which made him feel that he could
not get a fair trial.

(Id. at 6, 14). Mr. Mills' codefendants

told him that various members of the jury were personally related
to officers at the Gunnison Correctional Facility.

Additionally,

codefendants' counsel Mr. Neeley told Mr. Mills that the jurors
would be prejudiced against him if he went to trial.
5.

(Id.)

Mr. Mills also felt pressured by the fact that the plea
13

bargain offer was an all-or-none deal.

(Id. at 6, 14). He

feared, based on his codefendants' actions and statements, that
there would be physical and mental retaliation from them if he
were to refuse to accept the offer and thereby preclude its
availability to the others.
6.

(Id.)

Mr. Mills' fear of retaliation was also based on

knowledge of common custom among prison inmates that retaliation
is possible in such circumstances.

(Id. at 10-11).

Mr. Eaton

testified that because of unstated rules of prison life, one need
not verbalize a specific threat in order for it to be realized.
(Id. at 13).
7.

Mr. Mills inquired intro whether he could plead no

contest, but was told that such a plea would not be acceptable,
and that his attempt to enter such a plea would defeat the plea
bargain for all defendants.
8.

(Id. at 7).

Based on his fear of retaliation together with the

coercive remarks by codefendants' counsel Neeley and the
codefendants themselves, Mr. Mills accepted the plea bargain and
entered his guilty pleas.
9.

(Id. at 7) .

The record indicates no inquiry at the time the pleas

were taken from the trial judge as to whether Mr. Mills' pleas
were voluntary.
33-36).

(Id. at 7; see also Jury Trial Transcript at

Mr. Mills did not offer his concerns to the court
14

because the other defendants were physically present and would
know that he was defeating the plea bargain.
Transcript at 7).

Nor did Mr. Mills inform his attorney Mr.

Gleave of his fear of retaliation.
10.

(Withdrawal of Plea

(Id. at 9).

The record is without any reference to the nature and

elements of the offenses the defendant pled to, nor is there any
reference in the record that Mr. Mill's pleas were an admission
of all those elements.
11.

The record is devoid of any waiver by Mr. Mills of his

constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

Mr. Mills

incriminated himself when he plead guilty to two offenses.

Jury

Trial Transcript at 34, 35).
The trial court denied Mr. Mills' motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas, and this appeal was filed.

15

SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
Recent controlling Utah case law makes clear that, where a
criminal defendant expresses the intent to enter a guilty plea,
the trial judge must enter into a detailed colloquy with the
defendant under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
to ensure that the defendant is fully informed of his fundamental
constitutional rights and other important information.

Such

colloquy must occur at the time the plea is accepted by the trial
court.
The Rule 11 requirements function to ensure that the
defendant's plea is entered knowingly and voluntarily, and the
Rule must therefore be strictly followed.

Failure to strictly

comply with any of requirements of Rule 11(e) with the defendant
at the time of plea amounts to good cause as a matter of law to
allow the defendant to later withdraw his plea.
In this case, the relevant record clearly reflects that Rule
11(e) was not strictly complied with at the time Mr. Mills
entered his guilty pleas.

In fact, little Rule 11(e) colloquy

was engaged in by the trial judge.

Specifically, Mr. Mills was

never informed of the specific elements and nature of the crimes
to which he pled guilty, and the fact that the State would have
to prove each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

Nor

was he questioned as to the voluntariness of his pleas. Mr.
16

Mills did not waive his constitutional rights against selfincrimination prior to entering the two guilty pleas, and
finally, the trial court was not informed of the nature of the
plea agreement.

The failure to strictly comply with these

requirements deprives the defendant of fundamental constitutional
rights to which he is entitled.
In short, the trial court simply failed to ensure, by way of
questioning, colloquy, and affidavit, that Mr. Mills' pleas were
voluntary or that Mr. Mills understood the nature and elements of
the offense to which his pleas were entered or that he waived his
constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

Such

circumstances clearly represent good cause as a matter of law for
allowing withdrawal of the guilty pleas and therefore, the trial
court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Mills' motion to
withdraw those guilty pleas.
Even where Rule 11 is strictly followed, a defendant's plea
may be entered involuntarily, and thus should be allowed to be
withdrawn.

One such situation contemplated by case law and the

purpose behind Rule 11 is where the plea is the product of
coercion or threat, or is entered under duress.

Federal courts

have drawn specific attention to "package deal" plea bargains as
situations where coercion is especially likely to occur.

As

such, courts have held that the trial court's responsibility of
17

ensuring voluntariness of pleas is heightened in such situations
and a more intensive and comprehensive examination and colloquy
by the trial judge is necessary.
Mr. Mills demonstrated by testimony before the trial court
that the posturing of the case and various other coercive
circumstances caused him to fear physical and mental retaliation
if he refused to enter the guilty plea.
Firstly, the trial court refused Mr. Mills' motion to sever
the five defendants and allow him to stand trial alone, despite
the fact that he was faced with different charges that would call
for defensive strategies at odds with the other defendants, and
that the plurality of defendants would itself tend to prejudice
him on the charge of riot.
Secondly, comments made by the other defendants and their
counsel at trial about a hostile jury caused Mr. Mills to believe
that he would not receive a fair trial.
Thirdly, the plea bargain offered at trial was a "package
deal" conditioned on acceptance by all defendants, despite the
fact that their charges varied, and Mr. Mills did not stand to
benefit in terms of prison time while the other defendants did.
Because the other defendants desired to accept the plea bargain,
and would be precluded from doing so if Mr. Mills did not accept,
Mr. Mills feared he would suffer physical and mental retaliation
18

in prison if he refused to plead guilty.
Collectively, these factors demonstrate that Mr. Mills'
guilty plea was entered involuntarily, under duress and coercion,
and therefore that good cause was before the trial court to allow
Mr. Mills to withdraw his guilty pleas.
Therefore, the trial court's denial of Mr. Mills' motion,
was therefore an abuse of discretion, and this Court should
vacate the decision and remand to the trial court with
instructions to allow Mr. Mills to withdraw his pleas.

19

ARGUMENT

I.

The trial court failed to strictly comply with Rule 11(e).
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure concerns

the taking of guilty pleas, and places numerous requirements on
trial courts where a guilty plea is received.

These important

requirements stem from the fundamental nature of the
constitutional rights that a defendant waives when entering a
guilty plea, and the advantages and options that he must forego.
What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment
demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in
canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a
full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its
consequences•
Bovkin v. Alabama. 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712-13,
23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).

A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea by

showing good cause, and with leave of the court.

U.C.A.

77-13-6(2)(a) (1953 as amended).
A trial court has abused its discretion as a matter of law
if it does not permit a defendant to withdraw a plea that was not
taken in strict compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
App. 1994), citing

State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah
State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 476 (Utah App.

1991), cert, denied,

836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).

fl

[A] trial

court's failure to strictly comply with Rule 11 in accepting a
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guilty or no contest plea constitutes good cause, as a matter of
law, for the withdrawal of that plea."

Smith at 476.

"It is

critical • . . that strict Rule 11 compliance be demonstrated on
the record at the time the guilty or no contest plea is entered.11
Smith at 477,
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) is the sentinel
Utah case on the issue of compliance with Rule 11(e) when
accepting a guilty plea.

In that case, Gibbons pled guilty to

various charges at his arraignment.

The trial court engaged in a

fairly extensive dialogue with Gibbons, discussing the contents
of the information, various rights that he would waive, and
questioning him as to the voluntariness of his plea.
1310-11.

Id. at

On appeal, Gibbons complained that the trial court

failed to adequately inform him of the elements of the crimes
charged.
The Utah Supreme Court proceeded to issue "a statement of
the law concerning the taking of guilty pleas in all trial courts
in this state . . . ."

Id. at 1312.

The Court formed its

"statement" with rulings of the United States Supreme Court:
"Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of
ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are
complied with when a guilty plea is entered."
v. Alabama.

Id., citing Bovkin

The Court went on to provide a lengthy list of what
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a proper plea affidavit should contain.

However, the Court also

made clear that even where such an affidavit is used, the trial
judge must personally "review the statements in the affidavit
with the defendant, question the defendant concerning his
understanding of it, and fulfill the other requirements [under
Rule 11] on the record before accepting the guilty plea."

Id. at

1314.
The Court in explanation of the requirement that the
defendant understand the elements of the offense to which he
pleads cites Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49
L.Ed.2d 108 (1976) wherein it is stated that "clearly the plea
could not be voluntary in the sense that it constituted an
intelligent admission that he committed the offense unless the
defendant received real notice of the true nature of the charge
against him, the first, and most universally recognized,
requirement of due process. Id. at 645 (quoting Smith v. O'Grady,
312 U.S. 329, 334, 61 S.Ct. 572, 85 L.Ed 859 (1941).
In addition, the Court citing McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969) stated that "the
factual elements of the charges against the defendant must be
explained in the taking of a guilty plea so that the defendant
understands and admits those elements:

[B]ecause a guilty plea

is an admission of all of the elements of a formal criminal
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charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant
possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts. .
." Id. at 466.
The Court parted with the admonition that, "[t]his procedure
may take additional time, but constitutional rights may not be
sacrificed in the name of judicial economy."

Gibbons, at 1314.

In State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772 (Utah App. 1990) the trial
court failed to inform the defendant

entered a guilty plea on

the day of trial, waived the two-day minimum for sentencing, and
was sentenced immediately.

Id. at 772-73. The trial judge

failed to strictly comply with Rule 11 in much the same manner as
the case at bar.

In that case, the trial judge engaged in a

colloquy with Pharris regarding the consequences of the guilty
plea.

Id. at 773.

Pharris was unsatisfied with the sentence and

moved to withdraw his plea, his motion was denied, and Pharris
appealed.
This Court vacated Pharris7 conviction and remanded the case
to the trial court to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea.

The

Court held that despite the fact that Pharris signed a plea
affidavit detailing the subjects under Rule 11, and engaged in a
colloquy with defendant in regards to the same, the court's
inquiry nonetheless failed to strictly comply with Rule 11 in
three regards:
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First, the trial court did not as required by [Rule 11]
inform defendant at the time the plea was taken that hewaived his constitutional right against self-incrimination
by pleading guilty to the offense.
*

*

*

Next, the trial court made no inquiry on the record
concerning defendant's understanding of the nature and
elements of the offenses as required by [Rule 11].
*

*

*

Finally, the trial court failed to review the possible
punishment with defendant as required by [Rule 11].
Id. at 777. This Court summed up the current status of the law1
in its the final paragraph of the decision:
Under the Gibbons strict compliance test, before accepting
the guilty plea, the trial court must review on the record
with the defendant at the time the plea is taken the nature
and elements of the offense, the constitutional rights
articulated in Rule 11 which he waives by pleading guilty,
and the allowable penalties.
Id. at 778, emphasis added.

See U.S. v. Daniels, 821 F.2d 76, 80

(1st Cir. 1987) ("Our conclusion [that a later hearing cannot
replace a full inquiry into voluntariness at the time the plea is
entered] reflects a prophylactic legal consideration, namely, the
desirability . . . of creating a full record the first time, . .

x

It should be noted that the recent case of State v. Truiillo-Martinez,
814 P.2d 596 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992), is at
odds with the ruling in Pharris, supra. at 3, regarding the "entire record"
approach. Truiillo-Martinez suggests that the test is not so strict as the
other cases suggest, and that certain minor oversights in the trial judge's
plea colloquy may be remedied by the signing of a complete affidavit.
However, this disagreement is immaterial as applied to the present case
because Mr. Mills did not sign a plea affidavit that could have compensated
for the lack of investigation and colloquy by the trial judge. Moreover, it
should be noted that even in Trui illo-Martinez the trial judge engaged in a
much more thorough Rule 11 colloquy than in the present case. See id. at
597-98.
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. .") citing McCarthy v. United States, at 465, (noting that the
procedures established in Rule 11 are "intended to produce a
complete record at the time the plea is entered of the factors
relevant to this voluntariness determination.11); United States v.
Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that an
appellate court should confine its review to the record of the
plea proceeding); See also United States v. Coronado, 554 F.2d
166 170 n.5 (5th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 870, 54
L.Ed.2d 149 (1977).
State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah App. 1989) is also on
point.

There, as in the present case, the trial court relied

simply on a cursory and conclusory inquiry in accepting the
defendant 7 s guilty plea.

This Court found such inquiry "wholly

inadequate under [Rule 11]." Id. at 1334.

The Court held that a

specific and detailed inquiry is necessary, and that "[m]ere
general questions which ask whether a plea is 'voluntary' are
insufficient under [Rule 11]." Id. at 1335.
In the present case, it is without question that the trial
court failed in at least the same extent as in Pharris and
Valencia to fully comply with Rule 11 on the record.

The trial

judge engaged in virtually no dialogue with Mr. Mills in regard
to the implications of his entering guilty pleas.

The record of

the proceedings at the time the plea was taken contains no
25

mention of specific constitutional rights.

The record does not

evidence Mr. Mills' waiver of his constitutional rights against
self-incrimination.

Nor does it contain any inquiry by the court

as to whether Mr. Mills understood the nature and elements of the
offenses.

Neither is there any evidence that the court

questioned whether the pleas were entered voluntarily.
Gibbons, Smith, and Pharris all make clear that even where a
detailed plea affidavit is used to strictly cover all of the Rule
11 concerns and the affidavit is explained by a defendant's
attorney, failure of the trial court to further question the
defendant on all subjects at the time the plea is taken
represents cause to vacate a decision not to allow defendant to
withdraw his plea.

Reliance on affidavits or previous hearings

alone is clearly insufficient.

See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395

U.S. 238 at 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709 at 1712; Pharris, 798 P.2d at 777;
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1314, In the present case no affidavit was
used, and the colloquy and examination by the court would
therefore be even more important.

Nor may the trial judge rely

on defense counsel to fully inform the defendant of Rule 11
considerations:2

There is some suggestion in the record that the trial judge was relying
on Mr. Mills' counsel to inform and question his client.
THE COURT: Well, you were present. Didn't I ask you at one
time if there was any reason why I should not sentence them?
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Because of t h e importance of compliance with [Rule 11] and
Boykin, t h e law places t h e burden of e s t a b l i s h i n g compliance
with those requirements on t h e t r i a l judge. I t i s not
s u f f i c i e n t t o assume t h a t defense a t t o r n e y s make sure t h a t
t h e i r c l i e n t s fully understand t h e contents of t h e
affidavit.
Id. a t 1313.

See also Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 650, 96

S.Ct. 2253, 2260, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976).

In t h i s case t h e

record c l e a r l y demonstrates t h a t Rule 11(e) was not s t r i c t l y
followed, and t h i s Court should t h e r e f o r e vacate t h e t r i a l
c o u r t ' s decision and remand with i n s t r u c t i o n s t o allow Mr. Mills
t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y p l e a s .

MR. GLEAVE: Y e s , you d i d , Your Honor.
THE COURT: You told me there was no reason; i s n ' t that what
you told me?
MR. GLEAVE:

Yes, I believe I d i d .

Withdrawal of Plea transcript at 16-17. The Court made further reference to
having waited "while this matter they went over and advised a l l the rights."
[sic]
Id. To the extent the court was relying on the attorneys, such
reliance was insufficient as a matter of law.
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II.

Mr. Mills' plea was entered involuntarily/ under duress,
and coercion, due to the "package deal" nature of the plea
bargain and the fact that Mr. Mills was pressured and
threatened by codefendants.

Even if a trial court strictly complies with Rule 11(e), it
may abuse its discretion in refusing to allow a defendant to
withdraw his plea.

While adherence to Rule 11(e) requirements

may create a presumption that the plea was entered voluntarily,
"compliance with Rule 11 does not foreclose the possibility the
court abused its discretion in refusing defendant's motion if his
plea was in fact involuntary."

State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746,

748 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
"Good cause exists where the plea was made involuntarily."
v. Forsyth. 560 P.2d 337, 338 (Utah 1977).

State

The Utah Supreme

Court elaborated, in Forsyth, that "for a plea of guilty to be
valid it must appear that the accused . . . without undue
influence, coercion, or improper inducement voluntarily entered
such plea."

Id. at 338-39.

While Utah courts have had little opportunity to expand on
the principles alluded to in Forsyth, federal courts offer useful
guidance in applying a very similar Rule 11. A look to Federal
cases elucidates how an insufficient colloquy at the trial court
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level, especially with regard to questioning a defendant as to
whether his plea is voluntarily entered, is good cause to allow a
defendant to withdraw his plea at a later date.
at p. 21, 22, supra.)
fl

(See discussion

The determination of voluntariness is

[a]t the core" of Rule 11.

Mack v. United States, 635 F.2d 20,

23 (1st Cir. 1980).
Moreover, Federal cases specifically call attention to the
issue of "package-deal" plea bargains which condition the
acceptance of the bargain on agreement by all codefendants.

In

such cases, a trial court should be suspicious that a plea may
have been coerced, and must be extra careful and thorough in
questioning each defendant with regard to the voluntariness of
his plea.

See Bordenkircher v. Haves, 434 U.S. 357, 364 n.8, 98

S.Ct. 663, 668 n.8, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978); United States v.
Tursi, 576 F.2d 396, 398 (1st Cir. 1978), aff'd, 576 F.2d 396
(1978); United States v. Daniels, 821 F.2d 76, (1st Cir. 1987).
The very recent decision in U.S. v. Caro, 997 F.2d 657 (9th
Cir. 1993) involved a plea with very similar circumstances as the
case at bar.

In that case, Caro pled guilty along with three

other defendants pursuant to a "package deal" plea agreement.
The court was quick to point out the potential problems with such
agreements:
Consistent with the nature of the agreement, defendants7
fates are often bound together: If one defendant backs out,
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the deal's off for everybody. This may well place
additional pressure on each of the participants to go along
with the deal despite misgivings they might have.
Id. at 658-59.

In fact, as in the present case, Caro claimed

that the nature of the agreement had subjected him to coercion in
that his codefendants had pressured him into going along with the
deal when he did not wish to.

Id. at 659.

However, the

district court refused Caros' motion to withdraw his plea based
on such concerns.
On appeal, the 9th Circuit vacated the decision.

The court

first called attention to the fact that the government failed to
disclose the nature of the agreement to the district court at the
time the plea was taken.

The court found such circumstances

violate Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(2) which
requires disclosure of the agreement in open court.

The court

referred to the interpretation of Rule 11(e)(2) in Daniels:
"Rule 11(e)(2) requires 'disclosure of the [plea] agreement,7 and
that means that 'the parties are required to inform the trial
judge of all the promises that have been made, not only those
which they happen to consider important.'"

821 F.2d at 80,

(quoting United States v. Roberts, 570 F.2d 999, 1007 (D.C.Cir.
1977)); accord United States v, Blackner, 721 F.2d 703, 708 (10th
Cir. 1983).

(Utah's Rule 11(e)(6) has the same requirements as
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Rule 11(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,3
(Exhibit "G") and the principles related in Daniels should apply
similarly.)
The court did not stop at pointing out the Rule 11
violations, but went on to express the importance of the trial
court's heightened examination of defendant's plea in such
circumstances:

"We, in turn, have recognized that 'the trial

court should make a more careful examination of the voluntariness
of a plea when [it might have been] induced by . . . threats or
promises' from a third party."

Caro, 997 F.2d at 659 (quoting

United States v. Castello, 724 F.2d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert, denied, 467 U.S. 1254, 104 S.Ct. 3540, 82 L.Ed.2d 844
(1984)).

In the end, the court based its decision on the fact

that:
the district court was not aware of the package nature of
the deal, [and] its voluntariness inquiry was not the 'more
careful examination' of voluntariness our precedents require
when a plea bargain is conditioned on the cooperation of
more than one defendant.
Caro, 997 F.2d at 660, citing Castello, Id. at 815.
The facts and considerations in Caro, are strikingly similar
to what has occurred in the present case.

Mr. Mills plea

Utah Rule 11(e)(6) requires that the court find: "if the tendered plea
is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what
agreement has been reached."
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agreement was a "package deal," conditioned on acceptance by all
of the defendants.

Mr. Mills testified that he never did wish to

accept any of the plea bargains offered by the prosecutor at
various stages of the proceedings.

Mr. Mills did not accept a

bargain offered prior to the trial date, which was accepted by
two other defendants.

Nor did he wish to accept the ostensibly

"better" bargain offered immediately following the court's ruling
in chambers on parties' preliminary motions.

Unlike the other

defendant's, Mr. Mills felt that he stood to gain little by
pleading guilty.

He did not believe that either his time in

prison or his likelihood of parole would be affected by the plea.
However, the prosecutor and the trial court had put Mr.
Mills in an extremely difficult and potentially dangerous
position.
Firstly, the court had not allowed Mr. Mills to be tried
separately from the other defendants, despite the fact that the
variety of charges did not all apply to Mills, that his defense
would likely require tactics that conflicted with other
defendants defenses, and that the sheer number of defendants
could prejudice Mills on the charge of rioting.
Secondly, and most importantly, the prosecutor conditioned
the plea bargain on acceptance by all defendants.

If Mills were

to refuse to accept the offer, and not plead guilty to the
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reduced charges, all defendants would have to stand trial.
As was the case in Caro, Mr. Mills codefendants Jeffery
Eaton and Michael Land were eager to accept the plea bargain
offered on the day of trial.

The "bargain" was not strictly

balanced, in that Mr. Eaton stood to gain more by pleading his
second degree felony charge down to a class A misdemeanor,
whereas Mr. Land and Mr. Mills were charged with nothing higher
than a third degree felony.

Yet all three defendants would plead

guilty to the same level of offenses.

By accepting the offer,

both of Mr. Mills' codefendants believed they would receive
earlier parole dates.

In the presence of Mr. Mills they and

their attorney Mr. Neeley made it clear that they wished to
accept the plea offer.

They even, by their remarks and

representations, attempted to create the belief in Mr. Mills that
he could not receive a fair trial because the jury was already
biased against him.
Because the court had refused to let Mr. Mills be severed
from the others for purposes of trial, and because the prosecutor
conditioned the plea bargain on acceptance by all of the
defendants, Mr. Mills knew that his refusal to accept the offer
would operate to the disadvantage and significant consternation
of the codefendant's.

This is precisely the sort of situation

the Caro court warned of with regard to "package deals":
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Quite possibly, one defendant will be happier with the
package deal than his codefendant(s); looking out for his
own best interests, the lucky one may try to force his
codefendant(s) into going along with the deal. The Supreme
Court has therefore observed that tying defendants' plea
decisions together "might pose a greater danger of inducing
a false guilty plea by skewing the assessment of the risks a
defendant must consider.
Caro, 997 F.2d at 659, (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
at 368 n.8, 98 S.Ct. at 668 n.8.)

Indeed, in this case it did.

Mr. Mills then began to fear for his safety.

With all

defendants constantly present and voicing their eagerness to
accept the plea offer, Mr. Mills knew that a refusal on his part
would make them angry.

Though no one verbally threatened Mr.

Mills directly, he had good reason to believe that if he made the
other defendant's stand trial by refusing to plead guilty, he
could be in serious danger of mental and physical retaliation.
As defendant Eaton himself testified, in the prison environment
direct threats are unnecessary—there are "unsaid rules . . .
that all prisoners know automatically."
Transcript at 13).

(Withdrawal of Plea

It is significant that this candid

acknowledgement of an environment of implicit threat comes from
Mr. Eaton, who was bound over on a charge of possessing a
dangerous weapon (a "shank" or fashioned knife) in his cell, a
second degree felony, which was ultimately reduced under the plea
agreement to a class A misdemeanor.
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In this case, just as in Caro, the prosecutor failed to
inform the trial judge of the "package deal" nature of the plea
agreement, as was his responsibility.
n.2.)

(See Caro, 997 F.2d at 659

Thus, Rule 11(e)(6) was similarly violated.

Moreover, and

perhaps because of the failure to inform, the trial judge engaged
in no colloquy or examination in regard to the voluntariness of
Mr. Mills' plea, a violation of Rule 11(e)(2).

Either Rule 11(e)

violations amount to good cause to withdraw the guilty plea as a
matter of law. (See argument above.)

Additionally, the

shortcomings necessarily amount to a failure to meet the
heightened level of examination necessary in "package deal" cases
as discussed in Caro.
The circumstances in the present case created in Mr. Mills'
mind a reasonable and justified fear of retaliation if he were to
refuse to accept the plea bargain and proceed to trial as was his
desire.

Moreover, the fact that all defendant's were constantly

in each other's presence during the period of time between the
offering of the plea bargain and the entering of the guilty plea
effectively precluded Mr. Mills from communicating his fears to
his counsel or the court.4

The timely entry of his motion to

4

Not that such failure on Mr. Mills part is critical. The Washington
Supreme Court, relying on the federal courts, has recognized the Catch-22
nature of this situation, even where defendants deny improper influence before
the trail court. State v. Frederick, 674 P.2d 136, 140 n.3 (Wash. 1983); and
see Blackledqe v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1629, 52 L.Ed.2d
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withdraw the plea evidences that, as soon as he could effectively
convey his fears to counsel outside the presence of the
codefendants, he did so.
The upshot is that Mr. Mills' guilty plea was made under
coercion, duress, and fear, and was therefore clearly not
voluntary.

Accordingly, Mr. Mills should have been allowed to

withdraw his guilty plea, and the trial court's refusal to allow
him to do so was unreasonable and an abuse of the trial courts
sound discretion.

This court should vacate the decision and

remand the matter to the trial court with instructions to allow
Mr. Mills to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial.

136 (1977); Camillo v. Wvrick, 640 F.2d 931, 935 (8th Cir. 1981)
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CONCLUSION
On the basis of the arguments above and the evidence in this
case, this Court should find that David Mills' guilty pleas were
entered involuntarily and that he should be allowed to withdraw
them.
Rule 11(e) was not complied with at the time the pleas were
entered since the trial court failed to:

(1) inform Mr. Mills of

the nature and elements of the offenses to which he pled guilty,
(2) the trial court failed to obtain a waiver of Mr. Mills'
constitutional rights against self-incrimination at the time of
the pleas, (3) the trial court was not informed of the prior plea
agreement at the time of the pleas, and (4) the trial court
failed to find that the pleas were voluntarily made.

A finding

of any of the above deficiencies provides good cause as a matter
of law for allowing withdrawal of a guilty plea.
Mr. Mills pleas were not voluntary and violates Rule
11(e)(2), since he was coerced and pressured into entering them
by the "package deal" plea bargain which put him in the position
of either entering the guilty pleas or facing retaliation by his
codefendants who wished to take advantage of the plea agreement.
The trial court was not informed of the all-or-none nature
of the plea bargain at the time the pleas were taken, which
itself violates Rule 11(e)(6), and therefore could not
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effectively question Mr. Mills to ensure that he was not unduly
pressured into accepting the bargain.
The record is completely void of any reference to the fact
that Mr. Mills would waive certain fundamental rights by pleading
guilty to the amended charges and the record is likewise
completely barren of any reference to the nature and elements of
the offenses to which Mr. Mills pled guilty.
By demonstrating such facts, Mr. Mills has demonstrated good
cause for allowing his pleas to be withdrawn, and the trial court
abused its discretion when it ruled otherwise.
Therefore, this Court should vacate the trial court's ruling
below and should remand to the trial court with instructions to
allow Mr. Mills to withdraw his guilty pleas and stand trial
alone.
DATED this jAT day of December, 1994

ML
rir p.
P. Gleave
:erir
rtey ffor David M i l l s
irtiey
A^ellant/defendant
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.

Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas together with
an Affidavit of David L. Mills and Memorandum
in Support of the Motion
Notice of Appeal
Copy of Amended Information
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953 as amended)
U.C.A. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (1953 as amended)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(2)
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c/vniDi i JLL

JEFFERY P. GLEAVE (6 390)
HUNT & GLEAVE
Attorney for Defendant
195 North 100 East, Suite 205
Richfield, Utah 84701
(801) 896-4424

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:
Plaintiff,

vs.

:

MOTION TO WITHDRAW

:

GUILTY PLEAS

:

PHILLIP J. BOLIN, MICHAEL A,
BRADLEY, JEFFREY C. EATON,
MICHAEL A. LAND, and DAVID L.
MILLS,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:

Case No. 931600154
JUDGE DON V. TIBBS

The Defendant, David L. Mills, by and through his attorney,
Jeffery P. Gleave, hereby moves the above-entitled court for an
Order permitting the Defendant to withdraw the pleas of guilty to
Attempted Riot a class A misdemeanor and Attempt to Injure a Jail
a Class A misdemeanor.

These pleas were entered on March 21,

1994 and therefore motion is timely since the thirty (30) days
permitted by U.C.A. 77-13-6 have not expired*
As a basis for this Motion, it is the Defendant/s position
that good cause exists to permit withdrawal of his guilty pleas.
He alleges that his pleas were not voluntary but were entered to
avoid retaliation from his Co-Defendants in this case.
Specifically, there were three Co-Defendants remaining on March
21, 1994 who had not previously plead guilty.

The Sanpete County

State v. Bolin, et al.,
Motion tor Withdraw Guilty Pleas
Page 2
Attorney offered to reduce the criminal charges facing these
remaining Co-Defendants in a return for guilty pleas.
The offers were conveyed to the Co-Defendants but not all
were willing to accept the offered agreement.

Subsequently, the

Sanpete County Attorney placed a restriction on the offer that if
all of the Co-Defendants did not accept the offer, then none of
them would be permitted to accept it individually.
The Defendant felt that because of the restriction placed on
the offered agreement, if he had elected not to accept, then he
would have been subjected to physical and emotional retaliation
from the Co-Defendants, since they would not have been permitted
to accept the plea bargain without his concurrence.

(The

Defendant executed an affidavit consistent with these statements
and is attached as Exhibit A ) .
WHEREFORE, the Defendant requests that the Motion to
Withdraw Guilty Pleas be granted and permit the Defendant to be
tried by a jury for the offenses charged against him.
DATED this i,f* day of April, 1994.

r*

/&/>*']

jFE^V P. GLEAVE
i£o;rney for Defendant
David L. Mills

JEFFERY P. GLEAVE (6390)
HUNT & GLEAVE
Attorney for Defendant
195 North 100 East, Suite 205
Richfield, Utah 84701
(801) 896-4424

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO WITHDRAW
GUILTY PLEAS

Plaintiff,
vs.
PHILLIP J. BOLIN, MICHAEL A.
BRADLEY, JEFFREY C. EATON,
MICHAEL A. LAND, and DAVID L.
MILLS,

Case No. 931600154
JUDGE DON V. TIBBS

Defendants.

The Defendant, David L. Mills, by and through his attorney,
Jeffery P. Gleave, hereby submits the following memorandum in
support of his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas*
FACTS
The Defendant along with four Codefendants were charged in
an information with various criminal violations stemming from a
disturbance at Central Utah Correctional Facility.

Prior to the

trial date, Phillip J. Bolin and Michael A. Bradley accepted plea
bargains from the Sanpete County Attorney.

The remaining three

Codefendants did not accept the plea bargains which were offered
but prepared to undergo a jury trial to determine their guilt or
innocence.
On March 21, 1994, the day the scheduled trial was to begin,

State v. Bolin, et al.,
Memorandum in support of motion
Page 2
and after the jury venire was qualified, Judge Don V. Tibbs heard
argument in his chambers concerning a Motion for a Protective
Order filed by the Attorney General's Office of the State of
Utah,

After ruling on this motion, the Sanpete County Attorney

offered a plea bargain that was substantially nbetterlfthan the
original offer to the Defendants David L. Mills, Michael A. Land,
and Jeffrey C. Eaton.
This offer was not accepted by Michael A Land or David L
Mills,

Additional negotiations were undertaken by the

Defendant's attorneys and the Sanpete County Attorney,

While I

(Jeffery P. Gleave) was discussing with the Defendant, David L.
Mills, the modifications Mr. Blackham had offered to him, Mr.
Douglas Neeley, the attorney for Defendants Eaton and Land
returned to the room and announced that Mr. Blackham had stated
that either all of the Defendants were required to accept the
offered plea bargain or none of them would be permitted to accept
it.
The Defendant Jeffrey C. Eaton was facing trial on
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon at a Correctional Facility/ a
second degree felony and Riot, a third degree felony.

He was

very desirous of accepting the plea bargain and pleading to two
amended Class A misdemeanor counts and kept "encouraging" Mills
and Land to accept the offered plea bargain.
Eventually, all the Defendants plead guilty to the counts in
the amended information on March 21, 1994.
ARGUMENT
A portion of the guarantees granted to all accused persons
in criminal prosecutions, by Article I Section 12 of the
Constitution of Utah, includes:

the right to appear and defend
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in person and by counsel, to testify in his own defense and the
right to have a speedy trial by an impartial jury.

It is well

understood that the defendant may waive these rights if certain
requirements are met.

An important requirement that must be

satisfied is that the waiver must be voluntary.
To withdraw a guilty plea defendant must show good cause and
with leave of the court. U.C.A. 77-13-6(2)(a) (1953 as amended).
Good cause exists where the plea was entered involuntarily.
State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 338 (Utah 1977). In Forsyth, the
Utah Supreme Court stated, "we are in full agreement with the
proposition that for a plea of guilty to be valid it must appear
that the accused had a clear understanding of the charge and
without undue influence, coercion, or improper inducement
voluntarily entered such plea." Id. at 338-39.
In the instant case, the Defendant was subjected to undue
influence and coercion by his Codefendants and the Sanpete County
Attorney because if he had stated he did not want to plead guilty
to the amended information, the other Codefendants who desired to
accept the "deal11 would not have been allowed to do so.
In this case Defendant Mills, had made a Motion to Sever the
Defendants for purposes of trial.

However, this Motion had been

denied and he was involuntarily placed in a position where he
would stand trial not alone but with several other Defendants
which he felt was not is his best interests.

Furthermore, on

March 21, 1994, he was placed in position where he was required
to acquiesce in the offered bargain or suffer the consequences
from his fellow Codefendants.
Therefore, it seems apparent that by requiring the
Defendants to collectively accept the offered plea bargain and if
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not, prohibiting them from accepting it individually, that there
was coercion and undue influence exerted on Defendant Mills to
plead guilty to reduced charges.

As stated in Forsyth, Id,, good

cause exists to withdraw the plea if it was entered with either
undue influence or coercion which would render the plea
involuntary.

Here it seems that both undue influence and

coercion are present which makes the voluntariness of the plea
doubly flawed.
DATED this l$_

day of April, 1994,

^FERY P. GLEAVE
tor-ney for Defendant
David L. Mills

JEFFERY P. GLEAVE (63 90)
HUNT & GLEAVE
Attorney for Defendant
195 North 100 East, Suite 205
Richfield, Utah 84701
(801) 896-4424

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
DAVID L. MILLS

vs.
PHILLIP J. BOLIN, MICHAEL A.
BRADLEY, JEFFREY C. EATON,
MICHAEL A. LAND, and DAVID L.
MILLS,
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SANPETE

)
)

Case No. 931600154
JUDGE DON V. TIBBS

ss.

David L, Mills, after being duly sworn, states the
following:
1)

I am one of the Defendants in the above-entitled

matter.
2)

I involuntarily plead guilty to charges of Attempted

Riot and Attempt to Injure a Jail, on March 21, 1994.
3)

The reasons my pleas were involuntary are:
a.

The Codefendants were offered as a group a plea

bargain that by its terms, could only be accepted unanimously by
all of the Codefendants in this case; and
b.

I felt under extreme pressure from the County
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Attorney to accept this bargain since it was my understanding
that he would not permit me to go to trial on the charges alone;
and
c.

If I had not accepted the plea bargain, I could

have been exposed to physical and emotional retaliation from one
of my Codefendants who desired to accept the plea bargain.
DATED this

day of April, 1994.

David L. Mills
Affiant

*Y P. GLEAVE
-Oifney for Defendant
North 100 East, Suite 205
Richfield, Utah 84701

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

day of April,

1994.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEAS, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEAS and AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID L. MILLS was hand
delivered to the following, this
Ross C. Blackham
160 North Main
Manti, Utah 84642

/<('

day of April, 1994.

EXHIBITS
JEFFERY P. GLEAVE (6390)
HUNT & GLEAVE
Attorney for Defendant
19 5 North 100 East, Suite 205
Richfield, Utah 84701
(801) 896-4424

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH#
Plaintiff and
Appellee,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
vs.
DAVID L; MILLS,
Defendant and
Appellant,

Trial Court No. 931600154

Notice is hereby given that Defendant and Appellant, David
L. Mills, by and through his attorney, Jeffery P. Gleave, appeals
to the Utah Court of Appeals the order of the Honorable Don V.
Tibbs denying Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea entered
May 10, 1994.
DATED this Jj 7'
day of May, 1994.

d&-

*mRY P. GLEAVE
torney f o r D e f e n d a n t and
ipellant

CAI1IBII _fe

ROSS C. BLACKHAM (#0357)
Sanpete County Attorney
Sanpete County Courthouse
Manti, Utah 84642
Telephone!
(801) 835-6381

Q: fay&u-

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
VS.

*

)

A M E N D E D
I N F O R M A T I O N

)

Criminal No. 931600154

)

Judge Don V. Tibbs

I'

PHILLIP J. BOLIN, MICHAEL <f.
BRADLEY, JEFFREY if" EATON,
MICHAEL A. LAND and DAVID 4pL
MILLS,
Defendants.

)

The undersigned Complainant, ROSS C. BLACKHAM, Sanpete County
Attorney, under oath, states on information and belief that the
Defendants, at and within Sanpete County, State of Utah, did commit
the crimes of:
COUNT 1 - RIOT, a Third Degree Felony
and charges that:
On or about August 9, 1993, at and within Gunnison, Sanpete
County, State of Utah, the Defendants, as parties to the offense,
did simultaneously with two or
more other persons engage in
tumultuous or violent conduct and thereby knowingly or recklessly
creates a substantial risk of causing public alarm, or did assemble
with two or more other persons with the purpose of engaging, soon
thereafter, in tumultuous or violent conduct, knowing that two or
more other persons in the assembly have the same purpose and in
the course of an as a result of Defendants conduct substantial
property damage or arson occurred or the Defendant was armed with
a deadly weapon, in violation of Utah Code Annotated, Sections
76-9-101(1)(a)(b) and (3) and 76-2-202.
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COUNT

2 - POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON
FACILITY, a Second Degree Felony

AT A CORRECTIONAL

and charges that:
On or about August 9, 1993, at and within Gunnison, Sanpete
County, State of Utah, the Defendants Jeffrey Eaton and Phillip
Bolin, were offenders and did possess at a Correctional Facility
a dangerous weapon or implement of escape, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated, Section 64-13-35(2)(c ) .

COUNT 3 - ATTEMPTED ESCAPE, a Thira Degree Felony
and charges that:
On or about August 9, 1993, at and within Gunnison, Sanpete
County, State of Utah, the Defendants Michael Land, and Phillip
Bolin, did attempt to escape from official custody and confinement
in the State Prison, in violation of Utah Code Annotated, Section
76-8-309, 76-4-101 and 76-2-202,

COUNT 4 - INJURING A JAIL, a Third Degree Felony
and charges that:
On or about August
County, State of Utah,
and intentionally break
injure a public jail or
of Utah Code Annotated,

9, 1993, at and within Gunnison, Sanpete
the Defendant David Mills, did willfully
down, pull down, or otherwise destroy or
other place of confinement, in violation
Section 76-8-418 and 76-2-202.
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This information is based on evidence obtained from the
following witnesses: Ron Christensen, Doyle Cutler, Lewis Bagnell,
Scott Johnson, Steve Lund, Troy Morgan, Sandra Nunley, Jerry
Peterson, Tony Peterson, George Peip and Richard Whimpey.
DATED this

*Z0

day of January, 1994.
Byi

f^^Ah^L^fOSS C. BLACKHAM
Sanpete County Attorney

EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT "D"
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULE 11. PLEAS.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant
shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives
counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to
plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with
counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not
guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill pursuant
to Rule 21.5. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty
or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to
plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court
shall enter a plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of
the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case
shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail
shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases other
than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of
the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no
contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea
until the court has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he
or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not
desire counsel;
(2)

the plea is voluntarily made;

(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption
of innocence, the right against compulsory selfincrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before
an impartial jury, the right to confront and crossexamine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the
right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and
that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of
the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial
the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the
plea is an admission of all those elements;

(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature
of the of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for
each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea
discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement
has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits
for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of
appeal is limited.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for
filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or
guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside,
but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under
Section 77-13-6.
(g)

(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any
other party has agreed to request or recommend the
acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the
dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be
approved by the court.
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the
court, the court shall advise the defendant personally
that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding
on the court.

(h)

(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions
prior to any plea agreement being made by the prosecuting
attorney.
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached,
the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the
disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for
it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The
judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and
defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be
approved.
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition
should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the

judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the
defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the
prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty,
guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the
right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse
determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who
prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.

EXHIBITX:
EXHIBIT "E"
Utah Code Ann *§ 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
• • • •

(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or
capital felony;

EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT

,f

F"

Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 Withdrawal of plea.
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to
conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only
upon good cause shown and with leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest
is made by motion, and shall be made within 30 days after
the entry of the plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an
imprisoned person under Rule 656(1), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

EXHIBIT^
EXHIBIT "6"
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure/ Rule 11.
(e)

Pleas

Plea agreement procedure. (1) • . . .
(2) Notice of such agreement. If a plea agreement has been
reached by the parties, the court shall, on the record, require the
disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a showing of good
cause, in camera, at the time the plea is offered

